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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
1'TAH COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIOi\, a Utah corporation,
Plai11tiff and Appcllaut,
-vs.-

Ko.10509

\\-lLBl-RX DALI~ HEL~I and
jL\RlE L. HELl\I, his wife,
Dcfcnclants and Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
OF THE NATURE OF
THE CASE

STATE~[ENT

This is an action for a Declaratory Judgment declaring and determining the meaning of a lease between the
plaintiff as lessee and the defendants as lessors, or m
the alh·rnative, a reformation of said lease.

DISPOSITION

I~

Lff\VER COURT

Smnmary J u<lgment was granted in favor of the defondanb, and the plaintiff's :Motions to set aside the
Summary Judgment, for permission to file an Amended
Complaint, and for an Order requiring the plaintiff to
lllakt:· depm,;its in court pendente lite were denied. From
t]ip ~mrnnar.'- Judgment and denial of the plaintiff's
Jlotion~, the plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOl-GHT OX APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a setting aside of the Summary J udgment, an Order granting plaintiff permission to file its
_\mended Complaint and an Order requiring the plaintiff
to make deposits in court pendente lite.
ST_\TE)lEXT OF F_\CTS
On )lay 5. 1%1, the defendants \Yilburn Dale Helm
and )larie L. Helm. his wife. as lessors. entered into a
written lease agreement \\ith the plaintiff. rtah Cooperative _\ssociation. l R. I). The leased property eonsisted
of a senice station located on the old State highway just
north of Orem, rtah. and the plaintiff undertook to operate the service station pursuant to the lease agreement.
(R. 3. '·-!)
_\t the time of entering into the lease tht> plain:iit and
the def end.ants were a'nue that the leased premis.cs ,..-onl·l
be ust'd by the plaintiff as a senil•e statil•n an.:i t~<.1: the
new freeway nlrn· l"Olllpleted bet,._·een LeLi a:1d Pr,Y\•) ,..-a~
then bt'ing planned. ~R. 3. -!. hi. ~l1 \
Paragraph ; M' the 1ease be:,,·een
writtt'll tl) prl)vidt' as r'l)ill•ws:
Lt·~~l)r
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3
such damage or destruction, or if, for any reason,
the possession or beneficial use of the premises
is interfered with, the rent hereunder shall abate
until the premises are fully restored to fitness
for occupancy or such interference has ceased.
It is understood and agreed that if by reason of
any law, ordinance or regulation of properly constituted authority, or by injunction, lessee is prevented from using all or any substantial or material part of the property herein leased as a service
station for the sale and storage of gasoline and
petroleum products, or if the use of the premise:;
as a service station shall be in any substantial or
material manner restricted, or should any governrnen tal authority refuse at any time during the
term or extension of this lease to grant such permits as may be necessary for the installation of
reasonable equipment and operation of said premises as a service station, then the lessee may, at its
option, surrender and cancel this lease, remove
its improvements and equipment from said property and be relieved from the payment of rent or
any other obligation as of the date of such surrender.
rpon eompletion of the contemplated freeway, due to the
alteration of the flo"· of traffic away from the leased
1•remises, the plaintiff sought to exercise the option to surn-·ncler and cancel the lease and be relieved from the payllll"nt of rent or any other obligation pursuant to the
term::: of iiaragraph 'j' set forth above. ( R. 5, 16, 5:3) How1"\er. the defendants contended that the plaintiff had no
iizht to exercise the option and demanded that the plaintiff continue to pay to the defendants the rental pay1:1,~nt:-: reserved by the lease. IR. 5, 16, lS. 53) Subse,:>ntl,\·. tht_• plaintiff's original complaint was filed on
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July 1, 1965, (R. 15, 52) \\-hereby the plaintiff sought a <kclaratory judgment allowjng the plaintiff to exercise the
option described. Thereafh•r the defrndants answered the
complaint, denying that the plaintiff was entitled to the
relief prayed for. (R. 16) The defendants then moved
for summary judgment based upon the complaint and the
answer thereto and the affidavit of \iVjlburn Dale Helm,
one of the defendants, which affidavit was filed along
with the motion for summary judgment. (R 17, 18) 1\f r.
Helm's affidavit stated that paragraph 7 of tht~ lease
between the parties "was intendPd to cover situations
in which the lessee was prevented from using the station
by reason of an act of law, ordinance or regulation. That
it did not encompass circmnstancPs such as that complained of in the plaintiff's complaint." The plaintjff then
filed the counter-affidavit of Mr. Erval Hansen who affirmed that he had negotiated the lease with the dPfrndant
-Wilburn Dale Helm on behalf of the plaintiff and that
the terms of paragraph 7 pleaded in the plaintiff's
original complaint were intended by the parties to provide the plaintiff with the right to terminate the lease
in the event the contemplated freeway substantially impaired the profitable operation of a service station on the
leased premises. (R. 20) In addition, a second counteraffidavit was filed by the plaintiff, wherein Mr. \V. B.
Robins, the Executive General Manager of the plaintiff,
affirmed that the "subject matter of said lease, the situation of the parties, the purposes of the parties had in
mind at thP time the lease \Vas made and other surrounding circumstances showed that it was the intent of the
parties to provide" the plaintiff with tlw right to tenni-
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nate the lease in the event the completion of the contemplat<>d freeway substantially impaired the use of the
k•ased prerni ses as a St~rvice station. ( R. 22)

At the hearing on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the defendants introduced in evidence a
letter (R. 2G) from Henry C. Helland, State Director of
Highways, to defendants' counsel, wherein Mr. Helland
stated:
A public hearing for the proposed interstate
highway from Provo to Lehi was held in Provo
on February 2-±, 1958. The route as presented at
tht~ hearing with minor modifications was officially adopted by the Road Commission on March 17,
1958.

H was stated at the hearing that hopefully
the construction would start in late 1958 and be
completed about three years after starting. Bids
on the first construction in the area \Vere opened
on February 17, 1959 and the total route dedicated
and officially opened to traffic on August 28, 196-±.
The facts stat<'d by l\fr. Helland are not in dispute.

The hearing on defendants' motion for smnmary
jmlg111ent \Vas held before the Honorable J. L. Tuckett,
who took the matter undpr advisement. Thereafter, a
minutP entry (R. 25) was filed indicating that the defendants' motion had been granted and a summary judgment
was filed dismi,,;sing the plaintiff's action with prejudice.
( R. -±7) It is interesting to note that the Honorable Joseph
E. Nelson signed the summary judgment, although the
lwaring had been held lwfore the Honorable J. L. Tuckett.
(H. ~5, 47)
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After being notified of the summary judgment
against it, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the
summary judgment, (R. 55) togeether with motions for
permission to file an amended complaint, (R. 51) and for
an order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits in court
pendente lite. (R. 50) In Count I of its proposed amended
complaint, ( R. 27), the plaintiff sought declaratory relief
based upon that portion of paragraph 7 of the lease pleaded in its original complaint. (R. 28) In Count 11 of its
proposed amended complaint the plaintiff sought declaratory relief based upon that portion of paragraph 7 which
reads as follows :
. . . [i] f for any reason the possesion or beneficial use of the premises is interfered with, the
rent hereunder shall abate until the premises are
fully restored to fitness for occupancy or such
interference has ceased. (R. 30)
In addition, in Count III the plaintiff's proposed amended complaint alleged an alternative cause of action for
reformation of the lease to make it conform to the actual
agreement of the parties. (R. 31)
By its motion requiring it to make deposits in court
pendente lite, the plaintiff sought the court's permission
to pay into court the $275.00 per month reserved as rental
payments under the terms of the lease. (H. 50)
The plaintiff has not used the leased premises for any
purpose whatsoever since January 1, 1965, and since that
date the premises have been vacant and have produced no
income to the plaintiff, (R. 53) and although the plaintiff
used its best efforts to sublet or otherwise economically
use the property, it has been unable to do so since January
1, 1965. (R. 53)
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B1?tween January 1, 1965, and the time the plaintiff
fik·d its motion for an order reqiuring deposits to be made
into court pendente lite the plaintiff paid to the defendants the monthly rental of $275.00 per month or a total
of $2,750.00, during which time the plaintiff received no
income from the property. (R. 53). The amount of $1,100.00 of the $2,750.00 paid as aforesaid was paid between
the time this action was filed on July 1, 1965, and the filing
of plaintiff's motion for the requested order. (R. 53, 54)
After a hearing on the plaintiff's motions, the court
rPfust>d to set aside the summary judgment and denied
thP plaintiff's motion for permission to file its proposed
mnPncled complaint and also denied the plaintiff's motion
for an order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits of
the monthly nmtal in court pending the termination of the
litigation. (R. 8G)

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
rrHE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DE:D'1'~NDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JlTDGl\IENT AND REFUSING TO SET
ASIDE SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
THE REASON THAT PARAGRAPH 7 OF
rrHE LEASE CLEARLY ENTITLES PLAINrrIFF 'l'O THE RELIEF SOUGHT.
The lease executed by all parties to this action provides in pertinent part as follows:
7. Lessor shall keep in force at their expense,
sufficient fire and comprehensive insurance on the
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building to pay for the repair or construction of

~~id building if it is damaged or destroyed by

fire or other casualty, which policy shall contain
a loss payable clause in favor of lessee as its interest may appear. If tht' inernises are rendered
wholly or partially unfit for occupancy by any sueh
damage or destruction, or if, for any reason, the
possession or beneficial use of the premises is
interfered with, the rent hereunder shall abate
until the premises are fully restored to fitness for
occupancy or such interference has ceased. It is
understood and agreed that if by reason of any
law, ordinance or regulation of prnperly constituted authority, or by injunction, Lt'ssee is vrevented from using all or any substantial or material part of the property herein leased as a serviee
station for the sale and storage of gasoline and
petroleum products, or if the usp, of the premises
as a service station shall be in any s11l1stc111tial or
material manner restricted, or should any governmental authority refuse at any time during the
term or extension of this lea~.w to grant such permits as may be necessary for the installation of
reasonable equipment and operation of said premises as a service station, then the Lessee may, at
its option, sitrrendcr and cancel this lease, remore
its improvenients and equipment from said property and be reliPved froni the payment of rrnt nr
any other ol>li9ation cts of the date of such surrender. (Emphasis added.)
The portions of paragraph 7 emphasized abow, by
use of the phrase "shall be in any substantial or material
manner restricted" leave no doubt that the construction of
a new highway resulting in a great alteration of the flow
of traffic away from the leased premises, as alleged ill
plaintiff's original complaint and in Count I of the proposed amended complaint, is a ground for termination of
1
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the lease. Th(~ generic, all inclusive term "any", like the
other terms used, is to be taken and understood in its
"ordinary and popular sense." (See 2 Jones on Evidence,
-1:91, p. 950 (5th Ed., 1958).) Certainly, the alleged construction of the new highway and resulting great alteration of the flow of traffic constitutes a "manner" by which
thP use of the premises as a service station were substantially and materially restricted.
\Yith regard to the present case, the conclusion as to
what the phrase means can be no different if the entire
sentence, of ·which the phrase forms a part, is considered
as a \YholP. 'J'he parenthetical phrases on either side
S1JPak of governmental manners and means of restricting
the nse of thP 1n·pmiscs as a service station. If the phrase
''in any substantial or material manner" is likewise understood to includP only restrictions from acts of government, then the recent construction of a new highway in
the art•a of tlw leased premises, as alleged in plaintiff's
original and proposed amended complaint, would enable
tlie plaintiff to terminate the lease as a result of the govenmwntal act of constructing the highway.
Tn audition, the plaintiff's contention that the subject
provision is plain and unambiguom; on its face, is substantiated by a consideration of paragraph 7 as a whole.
1t ht>conH~s obvious to tlw reader that paragraph 7 gives
to tht> LPsst>e thl' option to abate the rent due and contirnw the kast>, or terminate the lease and be relieved of
an;-' f'mther obligation thereunder, if the use of the premic:('" as a service station is interfered with or restricted
for an>· reason or by any means.
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It is respectfully submitted that the language of paragraph 7 of the lease between the parties clearly entitles
the plaintiff to the relief prayed for in its original and
proposed amended complaints. The trial court's summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, and dismissal of
plaintiff's original complaint with prejudice is erroneous
as a matter of law.

POINT NO. 2
ASSUMING THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT SUSTAINED IN ITS CONTENTION SET FORTH
IN POINT 1 HEREIN, THE COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\IENT AND REFUSING TO SE'T ASIDE SAID SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE REASON THAT THE OPPOSING AFFIDAVITS FILED BY THE
PARTIES RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE AS
TO MATERIAL FAiCTS.
Inasmuch as the defendants filed with their Motion
for Summary Judgment an affidavit wherein the def endant, Wilburn Dale Helm, stated that paragraph 7 of the
lease was not intended to permit plaintiff to terminate the
lease for the reasons alleged in plaintiff's original complaint, and and the plaintiffs filed counter affidavits
sworn to by plaintiff's agents stating just the opposite,
unquestionably issues of fact were created. Therefore,
the only real question for consideration here is whether
the contested facts are material, which materiality turns
upon the application of the parol evidence rule.
The law as to the propriety of granting a smrnnary
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judgment, where application of the parol evidence rule
is involved, was impressively stated in Kidman v. White,
1-1 U t. 2d 142, 378 P .2d 898 ( 1963). ·when remanding for
trial, following summary judgment granted by the trial
court, this court stated as follows:
In confronting the problem presented on thi~
appeal, we have been advised to remain aware that
a summary judgment, which turns a party out
of court without an opportunity to present his
evidence, is a harsh measure that should be granted only \Vhen, taking the view most favorable to
a party's claims and any proof that might be
proper, that might properly be adduced thereunder, he could in no sense prevail. That both
lrnrties hereto make plausible arguments that
the contract in question is so manifestly in their
favor that reasonabk, minds could not see it the
other way is a pointed commentary of the ability
of the human mind to rationalize in its O\Vn interests. It is equally so upon the desirability and the
propriety of resolving any doubts in favor of permitting courts and juries to settle such disputes
rather than ruling upon them summarily as was
done here.
'fo the same effect see Tanner v. Utah Poultry and Farmcres Cooperative, 11 Ut. 2d 353, 359 P. 2d 18 (1951).
Frnm the foregoing it is apparent that a summary
judgment where the question of parol evidence is before
the court, should not be hastily indulged. With regard
to tht'. pr0sent case, if parol or other extraneous evidence
is admissible to ascertain the intention of the parties
to the lease, then the summary judgment was erroneously
granted. Fundamentally, in Utah as elsewhere, the admissa bility of parol or other extraneous evidence
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turns on whether the writing undPr ronsideration is uncertain or ambiguous. It is the plaintiff's position, as
discussed in Point 1 herein, that paragraph 7 of the lease
in question is so clear and unambiguous as to entitle
the plaintiff to terminate the }Pase with impunity, without
resorting to extraneous or parol evidence. Hmnver,
should th(' court conclude that the language in question
does not clearly support the plaintiff's contention, then,
at the very least, it must be said that the language is uncertain or ambiguous, thereby making extraneous or
parol evidence admissible for the purpose of explaining
what was meant by what was written in paragraph 7.
In Radley v. Srnith, 8
this court held:

l~tah

2d 1, 31:3 P.:2cl -tfi;J (Hl:\'i'),

Whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exist with
respect [to a writing] it is proper for t!te ronrt to
consider all of the facts and circurnstanres, including the ·words and actions of t!te parties
forming the background of tht> transaction.
The same rule was adopted, couched in different
terms, in Continental Bank & Trust Compa11y vs. Steu,art,
4 Ut. 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890 ( l 935), wherein it was held:
In view of the lack of definiteness in tht> tPrnls
of the contract it is proper for the court to receive extraneous evidence as to its meaning. It
is true that the expressed terms and agreement
may not be abrogakd, nullifiE•d or modified b,\'
parol testimony; hut wlwre lwcamw of vaguPn('f'~.
or uncertainty in tlw languge mwd, tlw intent ol
the parties is. in question, the court may ro_nsider
the situation of the parties, the facts arnl (•trrn111stanees smTonnding thP making of the eontraet,
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the purpose of ih; execution, and the respective
claims thereunder, to ascertain what the parties
intended.
In tlH' Radley and Co1zti11c1ital Bank cases, note the use
of the terms "uncertainty" and ''lack of definiteness" and
"vaguent>ss," whicl1 conditions, like an ''ambiguity" authorizt> the admission of parol evidence. The notation i::s
meaningful, for if the language of the lease in paragravh
I, n'liPd on in plaintiff's original complaint and in Count
I of plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, does not
clearl.r and unnequivocably 0ntitle the plaintiff to a favorablP judgment, or if the comt does not deem the language
ambiguous, tlteJl, with in the context of this case, the
language· usPd eertai11ly smack::s of "uncertainty," ''lad\:
o[ d(•finil('lWSS" 01' "vagU<'lll'SS." rl'his must be SO, for
11aragraph I obviously does not say '"the s<>rvice station
lease may 11ot be ter111i11atcd if the higlnrny con::struction
gTPatly alters the flow of traffic away from the leased
vn·rni:,.;es." In this connection, the holding in Bamberger
Co1111H111y r. Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Ut. 194, 48 P.
2d 4~9 ( 1935) is pertinent. '11 herein, faced with the constnwtion of a lease, the court held the lease ambiguous
and ('Ondud<•d that the allegation:,.; in the defendants' answPr had been improperly stricken by the trial court, then
wrote, a:s follows at +8 P.2d 29-t:
As stated before, we must give the defendant the
b<•nc>fit of evnry iuqJlication or inference which
rnay ari:,.;e out of tlw language of the parts strickt>n. Certainly, if tlw contract itself states definitely, so that then~ is no latent or patent ambgiuity as
to what altPrations are required, then there would
he no room for any <·YideneP as to what the parties
eontPmplated as eornprising the nPcessary altera-
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tions. If, on the other hand, the co11tract u·hile
on its face appearing to be certain u·ould OJJl'H
up an ambiguity u·hen attempts u:ere made to
apply it to the subject matter, then such ambiguity
could be resolved by evidence of u·hat mea11i11g
the parties thernselues intended to iwcest such
terms. (Emphasis added.)
In so stating, the court relied upon Kalueder 1;s. Jose1Jh
Schlitz Breiving Compa11y, 1-+3 "\Vis. 3-1-7, 128 ~."\V. -13,
wherein it was 'vritten:
Ambiguity in a written contract calling for construction may arise as well from words plain in
themselves but uncertain when applied to the subject matter of the contract, as from ·words which
are uncertain in their literal sense.
So also it may be possible for this court to conclude
that the words ''if the use of the premises as a service
station shall be in any substantial or material manner
restricted," as used in paragraph 7, are plain and certain,
as has been previously contended by the plaintiff, hut
uncertain when applied to the subject matter of the lease.
In either event, it was error for the trial court to grant
the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Upon application of the language of paragraph 7 to
the subject matter of this lmvsuit, it is difficult to comprehend how anyone could conclude that paragraph 7 of
the lease was intended to mean anything other than that
the plaintiff could elect to terminate the lease as alleged
in plaintiff's original complaint and in Count I of the
plaintiff's proposed amended complaint. In this regard,
the present case is similar to Brimirood llomcs, Inc. t'.
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Builders Supply Company, 14 Ut. 2d 419, 385
P.2d 98:2 ( 1963), ·wherein this court had before it for consideration the following language used in a receipt and
lit>n relt•ase which had been executed by the defendant,
Knudsen Builders Supply Company:
K1111dscn

This receipt is executed and delivered by the undersigned to the association to induce it to make
payment to the undersigned of the above stated
sum from the funds held bY it for the owner of the
above described real pro1;erty and in consideration thereof the undersigned hereby waives, releases and discharges any lien or right to lien the
undersigned has or may hereafter acquire against
said real pro1wrty.
Knud:sen Bnilders Supply contended that it was the intention of the parties in drafting the release as set forth
above, that said dc,fendant would release its right to a lien
only as to tlw amount set forth in the authorization and,
further, that tlwre was no consideration to support the
promisf~ to release any right to a lien that it might thereafter acquire. On the other hand, the plaintiff contended
that tl:e releasP was a three-party agreement whereby
the vlaintiff offered to pay the defendant, through its
agent, the association, upon the condition that the defendant release its lien rights, both present and future. In
spite of the langnage of the release, which on its face
simpl~- does not contain the qualification claimed by the
dPfondant, the court had the following to say:

l'11dcr the circumstances of this case, we do not
lwlit>ve that the defrndant, nor the plaintiff, intrnded that the relem;e and waiver agreement
would relate to anv future lien rights which deft.ndant might acql;ire. The executed documents

16
designated as a 'release and waiver' relakd only
to the particular debt paid and n~ceipted for i~
the particular transaction encompassed by that
particular instrument. This included any lien the
def<mdant 'has or may hereafter acqui1.'e against
the said property' in regard only to that particular debt. (Emphasis addPd.)
In the present case, it could also be said that "under
the circumstances of this case" the parties never inh•nded
that the plaintiff would be unconditionally bound by a
ten-year lease while knowing that the profitable use of
the leased property as a service station "·as in jeopardy
by the intended freeway construction in Utah County.
No one can be so naive as to think that this particular
circumstance was not a very important consideration in
May of 1961 when the lease ·was executed. The point made
here also finds support in the -Utah cas(' of Pen Star J.lli11ing Company v. Lyman, 64 Ut. 3±3, :231 P. 107 (19:2-t)
wherein it was said:
There is still another principal, which is also wPll
established, that, in case the meaning of tlw language is doubtful, one party to the contract will
be held to that sense in whch he lm<'W or nnd<'rstood the other party understood the doubtful
word or language.
Regardless of what the defendants now say was intended
by the language used in paragraph 7 of the lease, it cannot be seriously disputed that the defendants knew that
plaintiff ·was relying on the language of paragraph 7 to
provide a protective option allowing the plaintiff to terminate tht.~ lease in the ev!:'nt the highway construdion
substantially impaired the profitahl<~ use of tlH· ll·asPcl
prernisP8 as a servic<• station.

17
The rule in Cain v. Hagenbarth, 37 Ut. 69, 106 P.
!.l-±5 ( 1910) is also pertinent. The rule is as follows:
·when the exact meaning of a written contract is
in doubt, as where the language used is contradictory and obscure, and there are two interpretations possible, one of ·which establishes a comparatively equitable contract and the other an unconscionable one, the former should prevail.
At the time the lease was executed the business risks
occasioned by the intended highway construction were
apparent to all parties concerned. To read the lease today,
so as to conclude that the defendants incurred none of
these risks, while the plaintiff accepted the entire burden
of loss, ·would be manifestly unconscionable.
'11 here is another very important consideration. A

n•velant exception to the parol evidence rule \Vas recently
adopted in Bul!ough vs. Sims, lG Ut. 2d 304, 400 P. 2d 20
(1%5). This court therein restated the general proposition that imrol evidence cannot alter or change the plain
meaning of a document. However, in the language of the
court, "there are exceptions; one of which is that when
Uw varties place there own construction on it and so
perform, the court may consider this as persuasive eviclcnee of what their true intention was." In the Bullough
case, the parties had entered into a written agreement
sdtling the estate of their deceased father, and then
for several years thereafter engaged in conduct which
was contrary to the terms of the agreement. This court
;;im11l.\' held that the conduct created an ambiguity reganlless of the language of the document, and therefore
rnlc•cl that <'vidcnce of the conduct was admissable for the
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purpose of ascertaniing the intention of the parties to
the original agreement. By way of analogy, in the present case, the conduct of the defendants has implied an
ambiguity inasmuch as the defendants first suggPstPd
that paragraph 7 of the lease was not clear by filing
a factual affidavit with their motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs then filed counter-affidavits directed
to the intention of the parties so far as paragraph 7 is
concerned, and thereafter the defendants introduced into
evidence at the hearing of their motion for summary
judgment, a letter which they contended supported their
position as to what paragraph 7 actually meant. By
their conduct, the defendants have admitted that paragraph 7 of the lease is ambiguous and uncertain so far
as they are concerned. If the defendants are right in
this admission, then certainly parol evidence became
material in order to ascertain the true intention of the
parties to the lease, and the court erred in granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.
A case very similar to the present controversy, and
one which helpfully summarizes several applicable rules,
was decided in California in 1952.In Bartell vs. Associated Dental Supply Company) 11-! 'C.A. 2nd 750, 251 P.
2d 16 ,1952), the court had before it for consideration
the following paragraph of a lease:
From and after January 1, 1949, the lessee i~
granted the right to cancel this lease upon six
months writtPn notice or, at its option, shall become entitled to a reduction of nmt to be agrePd
upon mutually between tlw parties hNeto in tlw
event that the business of lt>SSPP has deelinPd to
a degree that it would he impossible to pay tlw
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rent herein provided, due to any or all of the
following causes or reasons, viz: Competition of
the Federal, state or other governmental authorities in the field of dentistry by health insurance
or any other media directly affecting the practice
of dentistry or in the ewnt of a material decline
in general business conditions or a major national
financial or business depression or recession.
fl1waking of the above-quoted provisions of the lease, the
court stated as follows:
... Let us examine the clause in question. Possibly a cursory reading of it might support defendants' contention that because of the 'or' the
lessee was given an absolute right to cancel while
the right to reduce the rent was conditional. But
a more thoughtful study of it, in view of the other
provisions of the lease, particularly the provision
for a five-year term [citing authorities] prevents
one from determining 'to a certainty and with
sureness' what is meant. On the very face of it,
it does not appear reasonable that parties would
contract that after January 1, 1949, (three years
after the beginning of the lease) the lessee, with
or without n•ason, could cancel, but his right to
an undetermined reduction in rental should be
conditional.
The difference of the meanings sought to be
given by the parties to the paragraph amounts,
in effect, to the question of whether or not there
:-;]10uld have been a comma between the words
'notice' and 'or.' 'That very fact shows the uncertainty of the paragraph. provisions. A matter
as important as a lease of business property at
$650.00 per month shonlct not be determined by a
court from the writing alone as to whether a
comma was intended or not. Such a determination
could lw only a guess . . . .
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The same may be said of the case now before this court,
for a lease of business property at $275.00 per month
for a period of ten years for the imrpose of operating a
service station on said property, which lease was entered
into by the parties knowing full well that a highway
would be constructed in the area of the leased Jlremises
which could reasonably be expected to divert traffic
away from the premises, is sufficiently important not
to resort to a guess as to what the k•ase means.
\Vhat was said in the final paragraph of the Bartell
opinion adequately states the contention of the plaintiff
in this Point No. 2:
In our case, the language of the lease is fairly
susceptible of either of the constructions contended for and, hence, extrinsic Pvidence [ma>·
be] properly resorted to in order to determine thP
intention of the parties.
POINT NO. 3
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY DENYING PLAINTIFF'S :M 0 rr I 0 N
FOR LEA YE TO FILE AN AThHJNDED COMPLAINT.
By its proposed amended complaint, the plaintiff
alleged as ·Count I precisely the sanw allegations that
were contained in plaintiff's original complaint, which
complaint was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. By Count
II of the proposed amended complaint, the plaintiff
sought a total abatement of the monthly rental based
upon an entirely different provision of paragraph 7 of
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the lease than had been alh'ged in the original complaint
and in Count I of the proposed amended complaint. The
proposed amended complaint also contained Count III,
~which Count stated a cause of action for reformation.
Our Utah Hule of Civil Procedure 15 authorizes
amPndPd and supplemental pleadings as follows:
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before
a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permtted and the action has not been placed upon
the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time
within twenty days after it is served. Otherwise,
a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the advPrse party;
and leave shall be freely given when justice so
reqiiircs. A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading within the time remaining for
respons(~ to the original pleading or within ten
days af tc>r service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court
otherwise orders. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ( e) (2) provides as
follows:

A party may set fort two or more statements of
a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically,
either in one count or defense or in separate
counts or defrnses. ~When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of
them made independently would be sufficient, the
pl<-'ading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or morr' of the alternative staternPnt~. A party may also state as many separate
daiins or defonses as he has regardless of consi st<'nc~-, and whether 11ascd on k'gal or on equit-
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able grounds or on both. All statements shall be
made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule

11.

Also relevant to this inquiry is Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure lS(a) which provides in pertinnent part as
follows:
(a) J oinder of Claims. The plaintiff in its complaint or in a reply setting forth a counter-claim
and the defendant in an answer setting forth a
counter-claim may join either as independent or
as alternate claims as many claims either legal or
equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party....
From the fon•going etah Rules of Civil Procedure,
it is apparent that the plaintiff's proposed amended
complaint was not unacceptable because more than one
claim or cause of action was stated, nor because alternative relief was prayed for, not because the claims may
not have been entirely consistent.
More particularly, Rule 15 clearly indicates that
permission to amend a pleading shall be liberally granted.
As was stated by Justice vVade in Ballard i:s. Buist, 8
Ut. 2d 308, 333 P. 2d 1071 (1959):
It has always been the rule in this State to be
liberal in the allowance of amendments to the
end that there can be a complete adjudication of
the controversy upon the merits and so that
justice may be served.

In addition, although it was decided prior to the enactment of our present Rule 15, Provo City vs. Claudin, 91

23

Vt. GO, P. 2d 570 (193G) contains the following pertinent
comment by Justice Wolfe:

It. n~ust be noted that the court may, upon sustammg a demurer, refuse to permit an amendment to a pleading if it deems no amendment can
be made which will circumvent the ruling.... In
such case, the pleader is virtually out of court,
it is as if the court had said, 'your pleading is
not good in law and, under the facts as I apprehend they can be pleaded, you cannot state a good
action or defense in law.' N aturallv
. ' it is not
usually done on a first complaint or answer because the court cannot ordinarilv know that other
facts to make the pleading good ~annot be pleaded.
And a refusal to permit pleading over where it
does not appear positive that no cause of action
or defense can be pleaded may run easily into
an abuse of discretion.
For those alternate reasons stated in POINTS 1
and 2, the plaintiff contends that Counts I and II of
the proposed amended complaint state valid claims
against the defendants, and the trial court was required
eitlwr to grant the declaratory relief prayed for in both
complaints or permit the amendment and receive competent evidence at trial as to what paragraph 7 means.
Contrary to the factual situation in the Claudin case
<1uoted above, in the present case the trial court was
not left to speculate as to whether additional facts not
allegPd in the plaintiff's original complaint could be
pleaded to state a good cause of action if an amended
complaint \Vere pennitted. This is so for the reason that
the plaintiff placed before the trial court its proposed
am<'nded complaint, and Counts II and III thereof state

24

additional, separate, alternate basis for relief not pleaded
against the defendants in the original romplaint.
In Count II of the proposed amendm<mt the plaintiff prays for a total abatement for the rent based upon
those provisions of paragraph 7 which read as follows:
. . . [i] f for any reason, the possession or beneficial use of the premises is interfered \Yith, the
rent hereunder shall abate until the premises are
fully restored to fitness for occupancy or such
interference has ceased.
Like the language or paragraph 7 relied on in plaintiff's
original complaint and in Count I of the proposed amendment, which plaintiff contends clearly entitles the plaintiff to the option to terminate the lease, it is submitted
that thP additional provisions of paragraph 7 as set
forth immediately above are clear and unambiguous in
providing the plaintiff with a total abatement of tlw
rent under the circumstances pleaded in Count II. If
this is not so, then again, at the very least, it must be
said that the language is uncertain or ambiguous so as
to make parol or other extraneous evidence not only
admissible but desirable for the purpose of determining
the meaning of the phrase. This is so for tlw reason
that the provision obviously does not say "there shall
be no abatement of rent in the event the new highway
alters the flow of traffic away from the leased premises.''
As to Count III of thP proposed amendment, therein
is alleged a valid cause of action for reformation of the
lease. The critical point here, is that the parol evidenee
rule is not applicable to an action for reformation. (~Pe
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8i11c us. Harper, 118 Ut. -U5, 222 P. 2d 571 (1950), and
l)pgnan, Parol Evidence - The Utah Versio11, 5 Utah
Law Revie\v, 158, 175 ( 195G). vVe are, therefore, hard
pressPd to fathom any legitimate reason why the trial
court refused to permit the plaintiff to file its proposed
amended complaint so far as Count III is concerned. As
was indicated earlier, if the trial court read the provisions of paragraph 7 of the lease contrary to the conh_•ntions of the plaintiff and also erroneously concluded
that paragraph 7 was not uncertain or ambiguous so as
to permit the admission of parol or other extraneous
evidence to explain its meaning, then \Ve can understand
why summary judgment was granted and why the trial
court would have been reluctant to permit an amended
complaint setting forth the causes of action described
in Counts I and II of the proposal. However, the same
cannot be said for whatever reason the court might have
had for prohibiting the pleading of Count III. The holding in Lone Star Motor Imports, Inc. vs Citroen Cars
Corporation (C.A. 5th, 1961) 288 F. 2d 69 is in point. It
was there held that ·where no grounds \vhatsoever exist
for denial of leave to amend, the test for abuse of discretion is satisfied and the trial court must be reversed
upon appeal. It \vill not do now, to say that the trial
court's refusal to grant the plaintiff permission to file
its provosed amended complaint was harmless, inasmuch
as und<T the familiar rule of res judicata the dismissal of
the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to the motion for summary judgment would bar a subsequent prosecution of
th1• elairn for reformation, inasmuch as the claim for
l'<'fonnation arises out of precisely the same facts and
c·i r<·nrn stanePs as the claim described in the plaintiff's
1

•

26
original complaint. (See Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 U. 2d
45, 37G P. 2d 9-!G ( 1962).) Thus, tlw refut>al to allow thl'
plaintiff to file its proposed amended complaint is tantamount to a dismissal of the cause of action for rPformation of the lease without any hearing whatsoever.
Surely, such action on the part of the trial court was
an abuse of discretion.
In the present case, the plaintiff's motion for leave
to file the proposed amended complaint was made within
ten days after the plaintiff received notice that the defendants' motion for summary judgment had been
granted. In addition, no prejudice whatsoever would havl'
resulted to the defendants had the plaintiff been allowed
to amend its complaint, plaintiff's motion was the first
occasion permission to amend had been sought, the motion was not an attempt to delay the proceedings, nor
can it be said the motion was made in bad faith. On
balance, it is submittetd that the letter as well as the
sprit of the law applicable to this issue clearly favor
allowing the plaintiff to file its proposed amended
complaint. Dnd<_•r the circurnstanc<>s of this case, the
trial court's refusal to permit the proposed amendment,
in the language of Justice Vv olf P, ran ''easily into an
abusr of discretion."
POINT NO. 4
THE TRIAL COURT I1~RRED IN DENYING
PLAIN'rIFF'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER
REQ1TIRING PLAINTIFF TO l\IAKF, DEPOSITS OF THE .MONTHLY RJ1~N'l AL INTO
COURT PEND1£NTE LITl~.
1
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Before tlw trial court, the plaintiff sought an order
n-'quiring it to withhold from the defendants the monthly
n·11tal payments provided for in the lease, and make
dt•posits of same into court pending a termination of
the adion. After inception of the lease on June 1, 1961,
tlw plaintiff undertook to operate a service station on
the leased premises. Beginning in the spring of 1965, for
those reasons alleged in plaintiff's original complaint,
the plaintiff communicated to the defendants its desire
to cancel the lease and be relieved from any further
obligations thereunder. Ho\vever, the defendants refused
to allow cancellation and this action was subsequently
counnenced on July 1, 1965.
rrhe plaintiff has not used the leased premises for
tlH~ operation of a service station or for any other purpose since .January 1, 1965, and since that date the
Jll'Plllises have been vacant and have produced no income
whatsoever to the plaintiff in spite of the plaintiff's
({forts to sublet or otherwise economically use the propPrty. Between January 1, 1965, and the time of plaintiff's motion for the requested order, the plaintiff paid
to the defendants a total sum of $2,750.00, and between
tht~ time this action was started on July 1, 1965, and the
time of plaintiff's motion the plaintiff paid to the defenclant8 the sum of $1,100.00.

A.
Plaintiff is Entitled to Relief from Payment of Rent
to ihe Defendants Pendcnte Lite.
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The Utah Declaratory J udgnwnt Act provides in
pertinent part, as follows:
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of District Courts-FormE_ffec~. ~h~ ~istrict courts within their rP:spt><>

hve Jnnsd1ct10n shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations, wlwther
or not further relief is or could be claimed. No
action or proceeding shall be open to objection
on the ground that a declaratory• J·udcrment
or
b
decree is prayed for. The declaration may lll'
eitlwr affirmative or nPgative in form and effoet;
and such declaration shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree.

*

*

*

78-33-12. Chapter to be Liberally Construed.
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its pmpose is to settle and to afford relief from wtcertainty and i11security tcith respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be lilwra\l~·
construed and administered. (Emphasis added)

The plaintiff has already paid to the defendants $1,100
since the beginning of the prPsent action on .July 1, 19G5.
Assuming the relief sought by this appeal is granted
in whole or in part, in order to afford the }Jlaintiff corn·
plete relief from ''uncertaintly and insecurity" with rl'spect to its rights in and to the monthly r<>ntal installments, relief from the payment of said paym<>nts to the
defendants pendente lite is essential. On the other hand.
in order to fully protect the inter<>sts of the defendant~
in this regard a requirement that the plaintiff deposit
said payments into court punmant to Section 78-:.2'i-J,
l~tah Code Am1otated ( 1933) would he proper.
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Affording such relief to the plaintiff and securing
such protection for the defendants ·would comply most
conqJlekly \Yith the legislative mandate of Section 78:J:J-12 wherein it is provided that the Utah Declaratory
.Jmlgment Act is to be liberally construed and adminisiere<-1. Pursuant to that Act, the pleadings before the
eomt contain prayers for declaratory and equitable relief
which relief will not be fully available to the plaintiff unless the court permits the plaintiff to withhold the
monthly rental installments from the defendants pending
the outcome of the present action. All parties to the
Lt>ase are engaged in a genuine dispute as to the
nwaning of the lease. Therefore, we can conceive of no
good reason why the plaintiff should be singularly burdened with the loss, and risk of loss, pending a determination by the courts as to what the lease means.
The risk and potential loss incurred by the plaintiff upon withholding the monthly rental payments from
tlw def Pndants, without court approval, are substantial
since a breach of the lease by failure to pay the rent
rPserved rould subject the plaintiff to an action for
dmnagPs, forfeiture of the lease, and possibly treble
damages as vrovided for in Section 78-3G-10, Utah Code
Annotated ( l953). In the alternative, payment of the
l't>nt to the defendants followed by plaintiff's action to
n•cover-back any portion of the rental payments paid
to the defendants, in the event the plaintiff prevails in
tlw pn•sent action, would be extremely tenuous in view
of tlw rule stated in 32 Am. J ur., Landlord and Tenant,
~Pdion -±72, as follows:
It is the general rule that payments
voluntarily made, although not owing,
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are not recoverable back, and if the payment or rent demanded of a tenant is
deemed voluntary in law, the tenant cannot recover such payment even though
the amount demand<~d and vaid \ms not
owmg.

It is submitted that allowing the plaintiff to withhold
the monthly rental payments from the defendants upo11
condition that said payments bt> deposited with tht' court
fully comports with the spirit and letter of the contrnlling
legislation. Equitably, the plaintiff is Pntitled to such
conditional rt>lit>f.

B.
The Order Sought by Plaintiff is
procedurally proper.
Section 78-7-24, Utah CodP Annotated ( 1953) provides as follows :

Process and Procedure when Statutory Provision Insufficient. -When jurisdiction is, by statutt>, conforred on a court or judicial officer, all
means necessary to carrv it into dfect are also
given, and in tiie exerci;e of jurisdiction. If the
course of proceeding is not specifically pointed
out, any suitable process or mode of proceeding
may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of the statute or of the rules of
procedure.
As originally enacted in Utah, Section 78-7-24 reads a~
follows:

\Vhen jurisdiction is, hy statute, conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all mPans nccPssary
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to carry it into effect are also given· and in the
.
'
exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by statute,
any suitable~ process or mode of proceeding may
he adopted \Vhich may appear most conformable
to the spirit of the statute or of the codes of procedure.
(It should be noted that the punctuation in the original
vcr:--;ion of the section is different than it appears in the
1953 Code. A careful reading of the two versions clearly
indicates that the most recent version is in error and
that the section should be read, punctuated as it was
enacted originally.)

lt cannot be questioned that Section 78-7-2-± is applicable to the present action since the jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments has been expressly conferred
upon the Utah district courts by Section 78-33-1, set
forth above. Nor can it be questioned that inherent within the power to render a declaratory judgment is a
court's power to protect the rights of the respective parties to the prseent action. As was discussed in Point 4-A
ahove, according to Section 78-33-12 a district court has
th(~ power to "afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relation:--;." Therefore, Section 78-7-24 is merely a legislative
mandate to the courts to adopt whatever procedure may
Ile lll'C'essary to implement their power.

In sum and substance, Section 78-7-24 is the statutor~· authority for creating whatever remedy or mode
ul' procedure is proper, just, and equitable under the
iiarticular circumstances of a given case. Said section
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is a codification of the ancient maxim, uui jus, iui reniediitm, 'vhich maxim means where there is a right,
there is a remedy, and whieh maxim was quoted with
apvroval Ly the l~tah Supreme Court in State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 228, 6-± Pac. 356, 361 (1901). Although
there is no Utah legislation expressly describing the
order requested by the plaintiff, the Morgan case confirms a court's right to devise new remedies, wlH're
neither the common law nor statute provide the necessary
remedies. rrhe Morgan case holds that the right to devise
new remedies was long ago recognized as vart of every
court's inherent power.

A situation similar m many respects to the fact~
and circumstances of the prescnt action was the subject
of TVatts v. Greenwood, 49 Utah 118, 1G2 Pac. 72 (191G).
In that case the plaintiff-mortgagor sought a writ of
mandamus from the Supreme ·Court to the District Court
of Millard County compelling the District Court to
comply with the Utah statute which provides that when
a mortgagee has connuenced a chattel-mortgage foreclosure by advertisement, and it is made to appear by
the affidavit of the mortgagor that the mortgagor ha8
a legal counterclaim or other valid defense against the
collection of the whole or any part of the amount dm
and secured by the mortgage, the court may, by an
appropriate order, enjoin the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage by advertisement, and direct that
all further proceedings for the fon•closure be had in
the District Court. In the TYutt0 case the mortgagor had
filed the necessary affidavit and originally the court had
entered the order requiring all further proceedings for
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the foreclosure to be had in the District Court. Thereafter, however, upon motion by the mortgagee the court
required the mortgagor to execute an indemnity bond to
hold the mortgagee harmless from loss for the reason
that the mortgaged property consisted of livestock which
would depreciate in value unless properly fed and cared
for, and for the further reason that the expenses of feeding and keeping the livestock would greatly depreciate
the mortgagee's security. The mortgagor delivered the
bond as requested. Thereafter, the mortgagee requested
an additional bond which the mortgagor refused to provide. Thereupon, the court withdrew its original order
directing that the proceedings for foreclosure be had in
tlw <listrict court, and then allowed the mortgagee to
forcelosc hy advertisement and sell the livestock.
In discussing the various alternatives available to
the District Court under the circumstances, the Supreme
Court relied upon Comp. Laws 1907, Section 720 (now
Section 78-7-:!J) and wrote as follows:
As already pointed out, the [statutory provisions J are purely remedial as well as highly
<'<1uitable, and, although it nwy not be expressed
in the section, yet the district judge or the district court has full power to enforce the spirit as
well as the letter of that section, and to that end
may invoke any suitable remedy that may be
jnst and equitable . . . .

. . . Indeed, it 11.'011ld

Sr'r'm

to require no great

i119c1wity to hold matters in status quo ar:d so

coll(luct the proccedi11gs [ umder the a.pplicable
statutory pro1:isio11s], that no inj11stice will res11lt
to either party. (I~1uphasis added.)
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The Watts case contains excellent examples of the
inherent flexibility available to a district court, and the
equitable considerations are very similar to those involved in the present action. For in the case at bar as
in the Watts case, it may be said: "Indeed, it would seem
to require no great ingenuity to ... so conduct the proceedings ... that no injustice will result to either party.''
0 iven the general principles discussed above, granting of the order sought by plaintiff would be proper.
However, more specifically, our research has disclosed
one case where relief similar to that sought by the plaintiff has been considered. In Foitch v. Rollins, 146 F.
Supp. 87 (Alaska, 1956), the plaintiff and defendants
had entered into a real estate conrtact under the terms
of which the plaintiff was to purchase from the defendants certain real property. The contract called for the
purchase price to be paid in installments, all of which
accrued installments had been paid by the plaintiff on
schedule. The plaintiff filed an action against the defendants wherein he contended that after the execution of
the contract he discovered that a substantial portion of
the house erected upon the subject real property was
encroaching upon a public street. He further contended
that upon discovery of this encroachment he demanded
that the defendants take necessary steps to remove the
encumbrance by moving the house within the borders
of the real property purchased. He then alleged the failure of the defendants to comply with his demands, and
damages.
Pursuant to Rule 67, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff sought the order of the court re-
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quiring the plaintiff, during the pendency of the action,
to pay all further purchase installments under the real
estate contract into the registry of the court. Rule ti7
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals
with deposits in court, does not expressly authorize the
relief sought by the plaintiff in the Fouch case, and as a
matter of fact, the court commented "diligent inquiry
fails to reveal cases decided on this facet of the rule."
The court therefore went on to state, "I am disposed to
determine this motion on the basis of the existing
equities,'' and then granted the plaintiff's motion, permitting the plaintiff to pay all amounts due and becoming due under the real estate contract into the registry
of the court pendente lite.
Given the equitable considerations ansmg out of
the facts and circumstances of this case and the broad
and liberal interpretation to be accorded the Utah Declaratory .Judgment Act and Section 78-7-2±, Utah Code
Annotated (1953), it is submitted that it was error for
the trial court to deny the plaintiff's motion for an order
l'equiring plaintiff to make deposits in court pendente
lite.
CONCLUSION
As shown by this brief, the language of paragraph
1 of the lease between the parties either entitles the
plaintiff to the declaratory judgment prayed for in
ils original complaint and proposed amended complaint,
or tlw provisions of paragraph 7 are so uncertain
and ambiguous as to admit of parol or other extrnllPons ("Vidence for the purpose of ascertaining the
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meaning of the lease, all of which make the trial court's
summary judgment erroneous as a matter of law. It
is also submitted that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the plaintiff to file its 111'0·
posed amended complaint, and that the trial court erred
as a matter of law in denying plaintiff's motion for an
order declaring the plaintiff to make deposits of the
monthly rental in court pt>ndente lite. Therefore, the
summary judgment should be vacated and set aside and
the trial court should be ordered to grant plaintiff permission to file its proposed amended complaint, and
issue an order requiring the plaintiff to make deposits
of the monthly rental in court pendente lite.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, RAWLINS, JONES
& HENDERSON
By KENT B LINEBAUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant

